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Abstract:  Forward guidance or more specifically policy duration commitment 
invented and developed by the Bank of Japan has become an essential part of 
unconventional monetary policy instruments employed by modern central 
banks.  This paper’s simple empirical analysis finds that the market believes 
or perceives Bank of Japan’s policy duration commitment to be credible, which 
has in turn helped the Bank to manage expectations of future interest rates and 
control the level and shape of the yield curve at an extraordinarily low range.  
The suppressed yield curve has contributed to reduction of financing costs for 
businesses and households and has supported macroeconomic growth through 
the conventional interest rate channel of policy transmission.  However, 
forward guidance including policy duration commitment does have difficulties.  
The magnitude of its impact has been time-variant, which appears to depend on 
evolution in policy frameworks and communication skills.  More importantly, 
this paper projects that the extraordinarily low and flattened yield curve 
coupled with maturity extension of the Bank assets could pose threats to the 
future income of the central bank in the event of policy normalization, which 
could have unintended fiscal implications.  
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Section 1: Introduction 
After the recent global financial crisis, “forward guidance” has gained recognition 
within the central banking community and the monetary economics academia as one of 
the most powerful tools in the panoply of central bank policy instruments.  Policy 
communication for transparency is not merely an obligation of central banks as public 
organizations in a democratic society.  Policy communication has now become an 
indispensable tool that modern day central banks must employ strategically and 
proactively to enhance the efficacy of monetary policy conduct.  Forward guidance 
could exert its influence on the financial and the economic conditions even if it is not 
accompanied by actual policy actions to change interest rates or to increase the 
monetary base. 
Forward guidance is a product of monetary policy evolution in the 21st century.  
The inventor of forward guidance is the Bank of Japan (BOJ)1.  The original Japanese 
naming of the concept was Jikan-jiku Seisaku, time horizon policy, if literally translated 
into English word-for-word.  At present, the prevailing terminology used for calling 
this concept is forward guidance.  But in order to distinguish this BOJ invention from 
other forms of broadly defined forward guidance, this paper shall call this forward 
guidance à la Bank of Japan “policy duration commitment.” 
The primary objective of this paper is to revisit BOJ’s policy duration commitment 
and to reevaluate the impact of this policy instrument.  Although there is a colossal of 
valuable academic literature on unconventional monetary policy instruments, existing 
research focused on BOJ’s policy duration commitment is still limited.  This paper 
intends to attract and invite more participants in this area of research by shedding some 
light not only on the positive impact of the policy duration commitment but also on the 
unintended consequences and challenges of policy duration commitment. 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 will provide factual explanations on 
BOJ’s policy duration commitment.  How and when it was invented?  How did it 
evolve?  Section 3 will conduct a literature review of existing research in this area.  
Although Section 3 is intended to be brief, it will have to extend the coverage to include 
broadly defined forward guidance, because the number of existing literature written 
using the terminology “policy duration commitment” is relatively small.  Section 4 
will evaluate how strong this central bank commitment is being perceived by the market.  
This will be measured by capturing the immediate response of the Japanese 
1 BOJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda stated in Kuroda (2014) “The Bank of Japan was the first central 
bank ever to adopt what is often referred to as unconventional monetary policy” at the end of the 
1990s and added “And although this is not widely known, it was the Bank that first introduced 
forward guidance.” 
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Government Bond (JGB) yield curve and the implied forward rates to BOJ’s quarterly 
publication of economic forecasts.  Section 5 will provide future projections of BOJ 
net income.  It intends to shed light upon quasi-fiscal policy consequences which 
might arise in the process of policy normalization from unconventional monetary 
policies.  Section 6 concludes this paper by sharing the author’s ideas on future 
challenges central banks and academic scholars may face in the age of forward 
guidance. 
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Section 2: Bank of Japan’s Policy Duration Commitment 
Subsection 2.1: General Description 
Policy duration commitment is a direct commitment of central banks to continue a 
certain policy framework in the future.  Because policy duration commitment would 
require announcement of guidance information about the future course of monetary 
policy, policy duration commitment can be considered as one typical form of monetary 
policy conduct employing forward guidance.  Simply put, policy duration commitment 
is a subset of broadly defined forward guidance2. 
In the 21st century, especially after the 2008 global financial crises, many central 
banks in this world have resorted to unconventional monetary policy tools or 
unorthodox policy measures.  One of such unconventional policy tools for central 
banks is to make a commitment today about continuing a certain policy framework in 
the future.  Such policy framework would include maintaining future policy rates near 
0 % or continuing periodic purchases of target assets in pre-set amounts. 
Narrowly defined forward guidance is merely a central bank’s projection or a 
central bank’s forecast of future economic conditions which can only indirectly suggest 
the future course of monetary policy.  In contrast, policy duration commitment is a 
direct commitment about future monetary policy.  Thus, policy duration commitment 
needs to specify the policy framework central banks would commit to in the future and 
also indicate the duration during which time central banks would continue.   
The duration of such policy commitment can be fixed, conditional or unconditional.  
Unconditional policy commitment would imply that a certain policy framework would 
continue as long as central banks do not explicitly announce termination or changes. 
Policy commitment with fixed duration would set a specific date or time when a 
certain policy framework would be terminated.  This is often called calendar-based 
policy duration commitment or calendar-based forward guidance. 
In cases where the duration of policy commitment is conditional, central banks 
commit to continuation of a policy framework including maintenance of policy rates 
and asset purchases until certain macroeconomic conditions are met in the future.  
Thus, policy duration commitment is in effect a declaration by central banks that they 
2 The definition or semantics of this “forward guidance” terminology deserves careful attention and 
thorough discussions.  Campbell, Evans, Fisher and Justiniano (2012) provide an enlightening 
distinction between Odyssean forward guidance and Delphic forward guidance.  According to their 
characterization, in the former, central banks publicly commit to future policy actions, whereas, in 
the latter, central banks publicly state their forecasts of future macroeconomic developments and 
“likely or intended monetary policy actions.”  Therefore, BOJ’s policy duration commitment 
discussed in this paper would qualify as one form of Odyssean forward guidance based on the 
Campbell et al (2012) distinction. 
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shall follow state-contingent monetary policy in the future. 
Such conditions could be phrased in qualitative descriptions of future economic 
conditions or could be quantitatively defined using numerical thresholds.  Some 
central banks which have adopted inflation targeting regimes apply the targeted inflation 
level as this numerical threshold and commit to continuation of a certain policy 
framework until this policy target is achieved. 
Why does policy duration commitment matter?  What does central bank 
communication achieve?  Commitment and communication about the future course of 
monetary policy matter because they are essential elements for the formulation of 
expectations about future interest rates and the current yield curve. 
Figure 1 provides a conceptual diagram on how central bank’s communication 
about the policy framework and future projections of economic conditions and prices 
could change the expectations for future short-term policy rates and the current 
longer-term interest rates on the yield curve.  This concept finds its foundations in the 
traditional expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates. 
 
Figure 1: What Does Central Bank Communication Achieve? 
 
(Source) Author’s production 
 
BOJ is the pioneer central bank which invented and employed the policy duration 
commitment conditioned on the achievement of numerical thresholds.  Although BOJ 
did not officially introduce inflation targeting until January 2013, BOJ’s policy duration 
commitment has been conditioned on numerical thresholds primarily defined by 
inflation indices since March 2001.  The next subsection will describe how BOJ has 
invented, developed and employed this policy duration commitment. 
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Subsection 2.2: Evolution of Bank of Japan’s Policy Duration Commitment 
2.2.1: Zero Interest Rate Policy 
In February 1999, BOJ announced that it would encourage the uncollateralized 
overnight call rate to move as low as possible by providing ample funds and would 
continue with the zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) “until deflationary concerns subside.”  
Although the duration of the commitment to continue zero interest rate policy was 
conditioned on such qualitative description of economic conditions, this could be 
understood as a precursor to the subsequent introduction of policy duration commitment 
conditioned on numerical thresholds in 2001.   
In August 2000, BOJ judged that deflationary concerns would be dispelled and that 
the conditions for lifting the zero interest rate policy had been met. Thus, the Bank 
discontinued the zero interest rate policy and allowed the policy rate to nudge up to 
around 0.25 %. 
 
   2.2.2: Quantitative Easing 
In March 2001, BOJ introduced the Quantitative Easing (QE) monetary policy 
framework.  The Bank’s QE consisted of four measures: increase in BOJ current 
account balances where commercial banks hold reserves; reintroduction of zero interest 
rate policy; policy duration commitment; and increase in outright purchase of long-term 
government bonds subject to the banknote rule.  Of the four components of this QE 
monetary policy framework, the first measure increasing BOJ current account balances 
can be called the narrowly defined quantitative easing. 
The third component of BOJ’s March 2001 QE framework was the policy duration 
commitment.  This is the first policy duration commitment conditioned on numerical 
thresholds in the history of central banking.  The Bank announced a strong 
commitment to continue the narrowly defined quantitative easing and zero interest rate 
policies until the CPI (consumer price index, excluding perishables, on a nationwide 
statistics) registers stably a 0 % or an increase year on year. 
In October 2003, BOJ decided to release its interim assessment of the economy 
between the publications of the semiannual Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices 
(Outlook Report).  The Bank also clarified what it exactly meant by the numerical 
condition phrase “CPI registering stably a zero percent or an increase year on year.”  
The Bank explained that this condition would not be met unless many Policy Board 
members make the forecasts in which the forecasted core CPI would register above 0 % 
during the forecasting period3.  
3 In the statement “Enhancement of Monetary Policy Transparency” released on October 10th, 2003, 
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Market participants interpreted this clarification to mean that BOJ was strongly 
committed to continue QE until the Policy Board majority forecasts core CPI inflation 
to be positive across all forecasting periods in the Outlook Report. 
In light of steady economic recovery and the expectations that positive CPI 
inflation would continue, BOJ exited from the QE monetary policy framework in March 
20064. 
 
   2.2.3: Comprehensive Monetary Easing 
In October 2010, BOJ introduced the Comprehensive Monetary Easing (CE) 
framework.  CE consists of three measures: reintroduction of zero interest rate policy; 
policy duration commitment; and establishment of Asset Purchase Program 
encompassing JGBs, CP, corporate bonds, ETFs and J-REITs.   
In the second component of CE, BOJ clarified the policy time horizon based on the 
“understanding of medium- to long-term price stability” which the Policy Board of the 
Bank agreed to in March 2006.  The Bank announced its commitment to maintain the 
virtually zero interest rate policy until it judges that price stability is in sight using the 
“understanding” as the criterion5. 
BOJ published the following understanding about the conditions for the policy duration 
commitment. 
“With the aim of laying the foundation for sustainable growth of Japan's economy, the Bank is 
currently committed to maintaining the quantitative easing policy until the consumer price index 
(excluding fresh food, on a nationwide basis, hereafter the core CPI) registers stably a zero percent 
or an increase year on year. Such commitment is underpinned by the following two conditions. 
First, it requires not only that the most recently published core CPI should register a zero percent or 
above, but also that such tendency should be confirmed over a few months. 
Second, the Bank needs to be convinced that the prospective core CPI will not be expected to 
register below a [sic] zero percent. This point will be described in such materials as the analysis 
and the forecasts of Policy Board members in the Outlook Report. To be more specific, many 
Policy Board members need to make the forecasts that the core CPI will register above a [sic] zero 
percent during the forecasting period. 
The above conditions are the necessary condition. There may be cases, however, that the Bank will 
judge it appropriate to continue with quantitative easing even if these two conditions are fulfilled.” 
4 In March 9th, 2006, BOJ also released “The Introduction of a New Framework for the Conduct of 
Monetary Policy” where the Bank explained its “understanding of medium- to long-term price 
stability.”  The document stated that the Policy Board members agreed that, by making use of the 
rate of year-on-year change in the consumer price index to describe the understanding, an 
approximate range between 0 and 2 % was generally consistent with the distribution of each Board 
member's “understanding of medium- to long-term price stability” and added that most Board 
members' median figures fell on both sides of 1 %.  Later, in December 18th, 2009, the Bank 
provided clarifications of this “understanding” stating that the Policy Board did not tolerate a 
year-on-year rate of change in the CPI equal to or below 0 % and that the midpoints of most Policy 
Board members' “understanding” were around 1 %. 
5 On October 5th, 2010, BOJ announced “Comprehensive Monetary Easing” and stated that the 
Bank will maintain the virtually zero interest rate policy until it judges, on the basis of the 
“understanding of medium- to long-term price stability,” that price stability is in sight, on condition 
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Market participants interpreted this reinstated policy duration commitment to mean 
that BOJ was committed to continue the virtually zero interest rate policy until the Bank 
judges that year-on-year rate of change in the CPI around 1 % is in sight. 
In February, 2012, BOJ expanded the scope of the policies to be continued under 
the policy duration commitment. The Bank announced its commitment to continue not 
only the virtually zero interest rate policy but also purchase of financial assets under the 
Asset Purchase Program6. 
BOJ’s expansion of the scope of the policy duration commitment is believed to be 
the first policy duration commitment by modern-day central bank which includes asset 
purchases as one core element of the policy framework to be continued7. 
 
   2.2.4: Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing 
On April 4th, 2013, BOJ announced that it will achieve the price stability target of 
2 % “at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of about 2 years,” and introduced 
the Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE).  QQE consists of four 
measures: adoption of monetary base increase as the operational indicator of 
quantitative easing; succession, overhaul and expansion of the Asset Purchase Program 
introduced by the former CE framework; integration of the two formerly separate 
modalities for JGB purchases; and policy duration commitment.  In this policy 
duration commitment, the Bank stated that it “will continue with the quantitative and 
qualitative monetary easing, aiming to achieve the price stability target of 2 %, as long 
as it is necessary for maintaining that target in a stable manner.” 
While the Bank emphasized that the QQE was a “new phase of monetary easing 
both in terms of quantity and quality,” it basically succeeded the traditional form of 
policy duration commitment which the Bank had been employing since March 2001.  
The duration of the policy commitment was conditioned on the numerical threshold, 
which was and is the price stability target of 2 % which had been adopted by the Bank 
that no problem will be identified in examining risk factors, including the accumulation of financial 
imbalances. 
6 On February 14th, 2012, the Bank announced “Enhancement of Monetary Easing” and published 
the “price stability goal in the medium to long term” which was judged to be within a positive range 
of 2 % or lower in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the CPI and, more specifically, was set 
at 1 % as a goal for the time being.  The Bank added that, for the time being, the Bank would 
continue pursuing the powerful easing by conducting its virtually zero interest rate policy and by 
implementing the Asset Purchase Program mainly through the purchase of financial assets until it 
judges that the 1 % goal in terms of the year-on-year rate of increase in the CPI is in sight. 
7 The Federal Reserve System in the United States is believed to be the first central bank that 
followed the footsteps of BOJ.  On September 13th, 2012, the FOMC announced that the Federal 
Reserve would start monthly purchases of agency MBS at the pace of ¥ 40 billion which would 
continue until labor market conditions improve substantially. 
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in January 2013. 
However, for purposes of emphasizing the Bank’s strong resolve and determination 
to achieve the 2 % price stability target “at the earliest possible time, with a time 
horizon of about 2 years,” the Bank in effect adopted a communication template for 
explaining QQE forward guidance structure consisting of 2 pillars.  Figure 2 depicts 
the 2 pillar structure of BOJ’s forward guidance under QQE8. 
 
Figure 2: BOJ’s Forward Guidance under QQE 
 
(Source) Shirai (2014), Chart 2 
 
8 The interpretation of QQE forward guidance consisting of 2 pillars requires careful reading of the 
official statements.  Shirai (2014) admits that some market participants considered that the first 
description is a strong calendar-based commitment.  BIS economists Filardo and Hofmann (2014) 
interpreted that QQE included elements of both threshold- and calendar-based forward guidance but 
without explicit forward guidance on the policy rate.  Please also see Momma and Kobayakawa 
(2014). 
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Section 3: Literature Review on Policy Duration Commitment 
Subsection 3.1: Commitment to What? 
Earlier works by Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) advocated 
the significance of central bank commitment, especially when faced with liquidity traps 
or the zero lower bound of policy rates.  In order to “stimulate serious research” on the 
issue regarding credible policy commitment, Krugman (1998) suggested that BOJ 
credibly commit to 4 % inflation for 15 years.  On the other hand, Eggertsson and 
Woodford (2003) proposed that central banks credibly commit to history-dependent 
price-level targeting rules which would “create the right kind of expectations regarding 
the way in which monetary policy will be used subsequently” through the management 
of expectations about the entire future path of short-term nominal interest rates which 
“the central bank can clearly control” and “follow through on its commitment.” 
Here exists an important conceptual distinction regarding policy commitment.  
Krugman (1998) advocated central bank commitment to policy outcomes or policy 
targets, whereas Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) advocated central bank commitment 
to policy instruments especially future short-term interest rates.  In this respect, 
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) should be regarded as the first proponents of forward 
guidance or policy duration commitment discussed in this paper. 
 
Subsection 3.2: Assessing the Japanese Experience 
Ugai (2007) provided an extensive and informative literature review of theoretical 
and empirical research regarding the Japanese experience mainly during the Zero 
Interest Rate Policy era and the Quantitative Easing (QE) era.  Many empirical studies 
covered in Ugai (2007) find that BOJ’s policy duration commitment contributed to 
lowering the expectations of expected future short-term interest rates and the yield 
curve9.   Such studies also add that the increase in BOJ current account balances 
worked as a signal which enhanced the Bank’s policy duration commitment effect. 
Subsequent studies on BOJ QE era policies such as Shiratsuka (2010) and 
Nakajima, Shiratsuka and Teranishi (2010) confirm the above findings.  However, it 
should be noted that these studies showed that policy duration commitment succeeded 
in managing the expectations of future policy rates, but did not argue that policy 
duration commitment succeeded in creating inflation expectations.  In fact, Okina and 
9 Okina and Shiratsuka (2004), Baba, Nishioka, Oda, Shirakawa, Ueda and Ugai (2005) and Oda 
and Ueda (2005) all find that Bank’s policy duration commitment was effective in bringing down the 
yield curve.  But, in the event-study analyses conducted by Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004), 
the evidence for the effectiveness of BOJ policies was “more mixed than in the case of the United 
States.” 
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Shiratsuka (2004) and Nakajima et al (2010) provide empirical evidence which 
indicates that policy duration commitment alone was not sufficient to reverse deflation 
coupled with low economic growth or deflationary expectations in financial markets. 
With respect to the Japanese experience after the recent global financial crises or 
the great recession, Momma and Kobayakawa (2014) explain BOJ actions and its policy 
intentions.  The number of empirical studies which extend the coverage to the 
Comprehensive Monetary Easing (CE) era and the Quantitative and Qualitative 
Monetary Easing (QQE) era are limited so far, but hopefully more are in the pipeline.  
The pioneering works include Ueda (2012), Fujiwara, Nakazono and Ueda (2014) and 
Ito (2014).  Based on empirical evidence from the news analysis, Ueda (2012) finds 
that BOJ’s forward guidance, which managed expectations of future short-term policy 
rates, and targeted asset purchases both moved asset prices in the expected directions, 
but adds that such measures failed to stop the deflationary trend. 
In this light, this paper intends to contribute to the empirical studies examining the 
impact of policy duration commitment by BOJ and its consequences covering not only 
the QE era but also the CE and QQE eras. 
 
Subsection 3.3: Assessing the US Experience 
In the United States, policy makers and economists in the Federal Reserve System 
have made positive evaluations about the efficacy and macroeconomic performance of 
the forward guidance which the US central bank provided in the past decade.  For 
example, Campbell et al (2012) show empirical evidence which suggested FOMC’s 
success in communicating its future intentions to the public and further suggested 
“communication difficulties do not present an insurmountable barrier to monetary 
policy based on Odyssean forward guidance.”  
BIS economists recognize the contributions of forward guidance as well.  In their 
paper examining major central banks’ recent increased reliance on forward guidance, 
Filardo and Hofmann (2014) conclude that it “has so-far reduced the near-term policy 
expectations about the future path of policy interest rates, suggesting that near-term 
policy intentions have been clarified.”10  Such evaluations have made policy makers 
confident enough to characterize policy communication as the central element of 
effective monetary policy11. 
10 Filardo and Hofmann (2014) also note that, beyond the impact on near-term policy rate volatility, 
the evidence is more mixed and caution against believing in the continuation of forward guidance 
practices in the period after the exit from unconventional monetary policy. 
11 Bernanke (2013) stated “Communication about policy is likely to remain a central element of the 
Federal Reserve’s efforts to achieve its policy goals.”  Yellen (2012) and Yellen (2013) made 
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In contrast, economists in the academia have not given favorable evaluations of 
actual practices of forward guidance by the Federal Reserve.  Woodford (2012), the 
leading proponent of forward guidance, examined the intraday US dollar OIS rates on 
January 25th, 2012 when a new forward guidance statement was announced and found 
“market participants did not attach a 100 percent probability to maintenance of an 
unchanged target” for three years into the future.  He commented that forward 
guidance recently practiced by the Federal Reserve does not represent an ideal model 
because it “has taken only the form of predictions about the future path of the funds rate, 
given what can be known at present.”  Friedman (2014) expresses his skepticism about 
“central banks’ attempts at guiding market participants’ expectations of the future 
trajectory of monetary” based on his analytical model proposed in Friedman (2013)12. 
Moreover, analysis of large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) by the Federal Reserve 
has produced empirical evidence indicating the “portfolio-balance” effect which lowers 
the risk premiums13.  Studies have not found strong evidence supporting the signal 
effect of LSAPs which could lower the expectations of future interest rates14. 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) and Krishnamurthy and 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2013) examined LSAPs and found evidence for various channels, 
including signaling channel, safety channel, scarcity channel and capital constraints 
channel, through which LSAPs lowers interest rates.  Recognition of the signaling 
channel raised the question whether the Federal Reserve could have achieved the same 
outcome with only a statement on policy commitment or forward guidance, without 
actually purchasing the assets. 
 
similar remarks regarding policy communication and transparency. 
12 As the reason for his skepticism, Friedman (2014) points out the uncertainty regarding how much 
departure from the target policy makers will tolerate.  Yellen (2012) recognizes this issue of 
deviation tolerance and explains that, at the Federal Reserve which has the dual mandate of 
maximum employment and price stability, the essence of the balanced approach is that “reducing the 
deviation of one variable from its objective must at times involve allowing the other variable to 
move away from its objective.” 
13 Gagnon, Raskin, Remache and Sack (2011) show that reductions in interest rates primarily reflect 
lower risk premiums. 
14 Before the Federal Reserve terminated LSAPs in October 2014, the FOMC statements included 
sentences which indicate that the Federal Reserve “will continue its purchases of Treasury and 
agency mortgage-backed securities, and employ its other policy tools as appropriate, until the 
outlook for the labor market has improved substantially in a context of price stability.”  Thus, the 
Federal Reserve was at the time announcing two separate termination criteria for asset purchases and 
for maintenance of 0 to 1/4 percent target range for the federal funds rate.  This could have made 
the management of expectations for future policy even more difficult for the Federal Reserve.  
Shirai (2014) compared this with BOJ’s QQE forward guidance where the continuation conditions 
are applied to the entire QQE framework as one package. 
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Subsection 3.4: Issues and Challenges 
Literature review of existing research on policy duration commitment and forward 
guidance reveals three issues which require further discussion. 
First is the incentive mechanism which enhances the credibility of central bank 
commitment.  In this vein, Bhattarai, Eggertsson and Gafarov (2014) show that 
shortening the duration of outstanding government debt provides an incentive to the 
central bank to keep short-term real interest rates low in the future in order to avoid 
capital losses. 
Second is the future exit from unconventional monetary policy measures.  
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2013) argue that clear communication of LSAP 
policy rules is beneficial for preparation of exit steps.  Findings in Ito (2014) imply 
that exit policies would require coordination between the fiscal policy and monetary 
policy authorities. 
Third is further development of academic theory on monetary policy employing 
policy duration commitment.  Fujiwara et al (2014) warns that, theoretically, the only 
effective tool left for the central banks under the liquidity trap today is forward guidance 
or signaling role of the quantitative easing.  Although Krugman (1998), Eggertsson 
and Woodford (2003) and Friedman (2014) may differ in their understanding of the role 
forward guidance should play in modern central banking policies, they commonly argue 
that central banks can and do actually employ more than one independent policy 
instrument other than the conventional policy instrument of controlling short-term 
interest rates.  Traditional theories in monetary economics have established their 
models based on the premises that central banks can control only one independent 
policy instrument, but Friedman (2014) argues that monetary policy theory now needs 
to recognize the existence of at least two independent policy instruments. 
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Section 4: Evaluation of Bank of Japan’s Policy Duration Commitment 
Subsection 4.1: Methodology 
This section will evaluate the efficacy of BOJ’s policy duration commitment.  The 
evaluation will be conducted by analyzing the market reaction to the quarterly inflation 
forecast in the Outlook Report.  This is because the market’s response to the forecast 
would indicate the credibility of the central bank’s policy commitment. 
Let us assume that the inflation forecast published by BOJ is below the threshold 
level.  Based on the policy duration commitment, this would imply to market 
participants longer duration and further continuation of a certain policy framework.  
Therefore, the market’s perceived strength of the commitment would be reflected in the 
size of the immediate market reaction such as the shift in the yield curve or the changes 
in the implied forward rates following the announcement of such below-threshold 
forecast. 
Table 1 is the Bank of Japan Policy Board’s forecast of real GDP growth and 
inflation announced on January 22nd, 2009.  Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the market 
reaction to BOJ announcement of the monetary policy statement and the forecasts.  
The median of the CPI forecast for Fiscal 2010 was -0.4 %, which was 1.4 % points 
smaller than the 1 % CPI inflation threshold contemplated in the “understanding of 
medium- to long-term price stability” which had been announced in March 2006. 
 
Table 1: An Example of BOJ’s Forecasts of the Economy and Prices 
 
(Source)  Bank of Japan “Statement on Monetary Policy” January 22nd, 2009 
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Figure 3: Downward Shift in the JGB Yield Curve 
 
(Source) Author’s calculations based on JGB data published by the Ministry of Finance  
 
Figure 4: Decline in the Implied Forward Rates 
 
(Source) Author’s calculations based on JGB data published by the Ministry of Finance  
 
Although no additional policy action for monetary easing was announced on 
January 22nd, 2009, market reacted to the surprise news and shifted the yield curve 
downward for the 3-Year, 4-Year and 5-Year Japanese Government Bonds.  Moreover, 
the implied forward rates for the 3rd Year declined 8 basis points in two days after the 
publication of the CPI forecast by BOJ.  While the decline of 8 basis points may 
15 
 
appear small in absolute terms, it is noteworthy that the expected funding cost for the 3rd 
Year was cut by as much as one eighth even without any policy actions. 
Based on these preliminary observations, this section shall analyze the market’s 
perceived strength of central bank commitment by measuring market response in terms 
of changes in 2nd Year and 3rd Year implied forward rates immediately after BOJ’s 
announcement of the below-threshold CPI forecast.  Implied forward rates are 
calculated based on Japanese Government Bond yields data published daily by the 
Ministry of Finance.   
Market response to the CPI forecast announcement is measured by simply 
calculating the average of changes in the implied forward rates.  The changes are 
calculated by comparing the implied forward rates of the day before date of the CPI 
forecast announcement with those of the next business day of the CPI forecast 
announcement.  This analysis will separately calculate the impact of the announcement 
of below-threshold CPI forecasts for the 2nd Fiscal Year on the 2nd Year implied forward 
rates and that for the 3rd Fiscal Year on the 3rd Year implied forward rates. 
In many cases where the announced CPI forecast was below the threshold, the 
forecast announcement was accompanied by BOJ’s actual monetary policy actions, 
which may contaminate this paper’s measurement.  Therefore, in order to primarily 
focus on the market’s perception of the credibility of central bank commitment, the next 
subsection will first look into cases where the below-threshold CPI forecast 
announcement was not accompanied by BOJ’s actual monetary policy actions.  This 
will enable this analysis to isolate the changes in market’s expectation of BOJ future 
monetary policy, which should reflect the market’s perceived strength of central bank 
commitment.  In the second step, this analysis will also compare the results in such 
cases with the results in cases where the below-threshold CPI forecast announcement 
was accompanied by additional easing actions. 
 
Subsection 4.2: Results of the Analysis 
Between April 2001 and March 2015, BOJ announced its forecasts of future 
economic conditions and prices in quantitative terms 42 times.  These include the 
semiannual publications Outlook Report and the interim assessment between them.  
Within these 42 announcements, there were 33 cases where CPI forecasts for the 2nd 
Fiscal Year were the below the threshold and, in 7 of such cases, BOJ announced 
additional easing.  There were 14 cases where CPI forecasts for the 3rd Fiscal Year 
were below the threshold and, in only 3 of such cases, BOJ announced additional 
easing. 
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Figure 5 and Figure 6 illustrate the announcement impact on the 2nd Year implied 
forward rates.  Figure 5 measures the impact in cases where the below-threshold CPI 
forecast announcement was not accompanied by policy action.  On the other hand, 
Figure 6 measures the impact in cases when additional easing was also announced. 
 
Figure 5: Impact on the 2nd Year Implied Forward Rate (1) 
 
(Source) Author’s calculations based on JGB data published by the Ministry of Finance 
 
Figure 6: Impact on the 2nd Year Implied Forward Rate (2) 
 
(Source) Author’s calculations based on JGB data published by the Ministry of Finance 
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Figure 7 and Figure 8 illustrate the announcement impact on the 3rd Year implied 
forward rates.  Figure 7 measures the impact in cases where the below-threshold CPI 
forecast announcement was not accompanied by policy action.  On the other hand, 
Figure 8 measures the impact in cases when additional easing was also announced. 
 
Figure 7: Impact on the 3rd Year Implied Forward Rate (1) 
 
(Source) Author’s calculations based on JGB data published by the Ministry of Finance 
 
Figure 8: Impact on the 3rd Year Implied Forward Rate (2) 
 
(Source) Author’s calculations based on JGB data published by the Ministry of Finance 
 
Table 2 lists all the results of this analysis. 
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Table 2: Impact on the 2nd Year and 3rd Year Implied Forward Rates 
 
(Source) Author’s calculations based on JGB data published by the Ministry of Finance 
 
Subsection 4.3: Findings and Interpretations 
Close examinations of the results above reveal noteworthy facts about the impact 
of CPI forecast announcement which imply important lessons about policy duration 
commitment. 
Figure 7 shows that, in the 11 cases where CPI forecasts for the 3rd Fiscal Year 
were below the threshold level but no additional policy actions were taken, the 3rd Year 
implied forward rate declined by an average of 1 basis point.  It should be noted that 
the mere announcement of CPI forecast actually pushed the implied forward rate down 
even in the absence of any additional monetary easing actions.   
In sharp contrast, Figure 5 shows that, in the 26 cases where CPI forecasts for the 
2nd Fiscal Year were below the threshold level but no additional policy actions were 
taken, the 2nd Year implied forward rate declined by an average of only one tenth of 1 
basis point.  Below-threshold CPI forecasts for the 2nd Fiscal Year were no surprise 
news for the market, which had already been incorporated in the expectation for future 
policy rates. 
Compared with the market reaction to 2nd Fiscal Year forecast, below-threshold 
CPI forecasts for the 3rd Fiscal Year were surprise news for the market.  Such forecasts 
implied longer duration and further continuation of the current policy framework and 
made market participants revise down their expectation for future policy rates, possibly 
up until the end of the 3rd Fiscal Year.  This could be interpreted as an indication that, 
to a certain extent, market participants believe or perceive that BOJ’s policy duration 
commitment is a credible commitment. 
(basis points)
without policy
actions
when accompanied
by policy actions for
additional easing
without policy
actions
when accompanied
by policy actions for
additional easing
(26 cases) (7 cases) (11 cases) (3 cases)
QE Era 2001-2006 2.30 -1.60 no cases no cases
Post-QE Era 2006-2010 -0.74 -3.10 -4.77 4.12
CE Era 2010-2013 -0.28 0.25 1.30 0.75
QQE Era 2013- 0.36 0.20 -0.43 no cases
All cases -0.10 -0.50 -0.98 1.87
Average Change in the Implied Forward Rates
Two Days after the Announcement of Below-threshold CPI Forecast
Impact on 2nd Year Implied Forward Rates Impact on 3rd Year Implied Forward Rates 
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A closer look at the results of each era provides some interesting insights.   
During the QE era, the first period when policy duration commitment was adopted, 
the implied forward rate declined only in one case when the forecast announcement was 
accompanied by policy action (Figure 6).  This is in sharp contrast with Figure 5, 
where implied forward rates rose when the below-threshold CPI forecast 
announcements were not accompanied by additional policy action, which might suggest 
market disappointment at the time about BOJ’s inaction despite the below-threshold CPI 
forecast. 
During the Post-QE era, a remarkable decline in implied forward rates for the 3rd 
Year is observed (Figure 7).  The indication that policy duration commitment was most 
effective during the Post-QE era is quite ironic because BOJ never officially admitted 
that it was utilizing policy duration commitment during the Post-QE era.  Nonetheless, 
market participants in those days were apparently expecting the Bank to continue 
extraordinarily low interest rate policies and were convinced that the Bank would 
abstain from raising policy rates rapidly. 
During the CE era, the 2nd Year implied forward rate slightly declined, but the 3rd 
Year implied forward rate rose (Figure 5 and Figure 7).  This may imply that the 
market believed that BOJ’s policy duration commitment was credible only up to the end 
of the 2nd Fiscal Year and had doubts about Bank’s commitment to continue the policy 
framework in the 3rd Fiscal Year15. 
The QQE era show mixed results.  The 2nd Year implied forward rate rose and the 
3rd Year implied forward rate declined only slightly (Figure 5 and Figure 7).  As 
opposed to BOJ’s rhetoric emphasizing the commitment terminology, it does not appear 
that the market participants perceive the Bank’s policy duration commitment as a strong 
credible commitment. 
What would explain such counter-intuitive results?  One possible explanation is 
BOJ’s emphasis on its strong commitment to achieve the price stability target of 2 % in 
two years.  The words expressing the Bank’s firm determination and strong resolve 
coupled with announcements of CPI forecasts for the 3rd Year indicating the possibility 
of success in achieving the price stability target could have been interpreted by market 
participants as a signal that the Bank might exit from or wind down QQE immediately 
15 When BOJ introduced CE in October 2010, the Bank announced its commitment to maintain the 
virtually zero interest rate policy until it judges that price stability, understood as 1 % CPI inflation, 
is in sight.  Thus, the policy duration commitment under CE was conditioned not on current 
economic conditions but on current projections of future economic conditions.  Such 
forward-looking character of policy duration commitment gave room for speculation that the Bank 
might terminate CE at the time of the publication of the future CPI forecast achieving the 1 % 
inflation even if the current CPI inflation is below such threshold. 
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after CPI inflation reaches 2 % in about two years16.   
Even a whiff of suspicion that the Bank might not continue the current QQE policy 
framework could affect the market expectation of future policy continuation.  In spite 
of the Governor’s often repeated comments that any discussion of exit policies are 
premature and his emphasis that the Bank is always ready to do whatever is necessary, 
the Bank’s upbeat forecast which shows CPI inflation reaching 2% may be mitigating 
the intended impact of policy duration commitment. 
It should be understood that the QQE framework is fighting two wars of 
commitment.  On the one hand, the Bank succeeded the traditional policy duration 
commitment where the Bank is committed to continue the current policy framework 
until the policy target is achieved.  On the other hand, the Bank is overtly emphasizing 
its strong commitment, resolve and determination to achieve the 2 % inflation target so 
as to change the prevailing deflationary mindset of the general public in Japan and to 
push up the inflation expectations close to 2 %.   
But the two commitments could be interpreted by the market as if they were 
contradictory.  The success of one might harm the intended effect of the other.  As 
explained in Sub-subsection 2.2.4, QQE has been facing such subtle difficulty from the 
onset because of this dual commitment character embedded in the forward guidance 
structure. 
 
Subsection 4.4: Summary and Policy Implications 
The findings and interpretations can be summarized into the following three 
lessons. 
16 The following are excerpts of the English translation of Governor Haruhiko Kuroda’s comments 
at the press conference on April 4th 2013, the day QQE was announced.  The author translated into 
English the original Japanese transcript of the press conference records.  The Governor’s comments 
expressing confidence and the emphasis on having exhausted all necessary measures could have 
unwittingly sent to the market messages which imply that the Bank might abstain from continuing 
the QQE framework and from taking additional easing actions after two years. 
“The above-mentioned measures are monetary easing policies on a different dimension from 
the past.  First of all, we have parted with the idea of sequential injection of armed forces and are 
determined to implement at this moment all necessary measures.” 
“This time, we have exhausted all necessary measures.” 
“As I have repeated today, we have mobilized every policy tool that is conceivable at this 
moment.  We are determined to achieve the price stability target of 2 % with a time horizon of 
about two years.  I am convinced that all necessary measures for that purpose are included in these 
policy measures.  And I believe that we can achieve the target with the time horizon of about two 
years.” 
“The past approaches in monetary policy, where quantitative and qualitative monetary easing 
measures were incrementally implemented in a piecemeal manner, would not overcome deflation 
and achieve the price stability target of 2 %.” 
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First, policy duration commitment was and is effective.  Market participants, to a 
certain extent, believe or perceive BOJ’s policy duration commitment to be a credible 
commitment.  Such beliefs or perceptions appeared to have influenced the market’s 
expectations of future policy and the formulation of the yield curve. 
Second, the impact of the policy duration commitment was time-variant.  The 
magnitude of the impact was influenced by the economic environment, evolution in the 
manner and scope of policy duration commitment, and communications skills of the 
central bank. 
Third, although this may sound banal, communication skills and choice of words 
are critically important in policy duration commitment. For example, as explained in the 
interpretations for QQE forward guidance, the commitment to achieve the price stability 
target (policy target commitment) and the commitment to continue a certain policy 
framework (policy instrument commitment) could sound to the market as if they 
contradict with one another.  It may help to allocate different terminologies to the two 
different types of commitments.  Or it may help to reemphasize the Bank’s 
continuation intent by further clarifying the definition of necessary conditions for policy 
continuation17. 
 
  
17 Momma and Kobayakawa (2014) provide instructive explanations regarding forward guidance 
under the QQE framework.  They write “It may well be understood that these 2 phrases in the 
statement constitute new forward guidance. These 2 pillars of forward guidance, however, are 
complementary. In other words, the QQE is state-contingent and open-ended in nature, and it is not 
appropriate to say that the QQE will be terminated automatically in 2 years irrespective of economic 
developments. The BOJ will continue with the QQE if it is judged necessary to do so in order to 
maintain that target in a stable manner. The aim is to set the 2 percent anchor deeply in the public’s 
mindset and make the actual inflation rate hover around it. In terms of the Phillips curve, this means 
that the 2 percent inflation rate should become consistent with the average state of the economy; that 
is, when the output gap is zero.” 
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Section 5: Yield Curve Flattening and Bank of Japan’s Income 
Subsection 5.1: Contributions of the Policy Duration Commitment 
BOJ’s policy duration commitment accompanied by other means of 
unconventional monetary policy instruments including monetary base increases, 
purchases of securities including Japanese Government Bonds and maturity extension in 
asset purchases contributed to lowering and flattening the yield curve (Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9: Bringing Down the Yield Curve 
 
(Source) Author’s calculations based on JGB data published by the Ministry of Finance 
 
The decline in the yields in the range between 2-Year and 5-Year securities lead to 
the decline in the interest rates the commercial banks in Japan charge their borrowers 
for long-term loans.  Figure 10 indicates that interest rates on commercial bank’s 
long-term loans declined from 1.834 % in July 2007 to 0.875 % in December 2014, 
which is a decrease of nearly 1 % point while the policy rate, the uncollateralized call 
overnight rate, declined only by 0.5 % points.  After BOJ introduced CE in October 
2010, the interest rates charged on commercial bank’s long-term loans declined for 36 
basis points while the policy rate was virtually maintained at 0 %. 
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Figure 10: Decline in Commercial Bank Loan Rates 
 
(Source) Author’s calculations based on data published by the Bank of Japan 
 
Figure 11: Commercial Bank Loan Growth 
 
(Source) Bank of Japan “Monthly Report of Recent Economic and Financial 
Developments: February 2015,” February 20th, 2015, Chart 32 
 
The decline in commercial bank loan rates reduced financing costs for businesses 
and households and spurred loan growth after 2011, which in turn supported economic 
recovery (Figure 11).  Therefore, unconventional monetary policy in Japan including 
policy duration commitment helped the economy not through the unconventional policy 
transmission mechanisms but through conventional policy transmission mechanisms, 
which are the interest rate channel and the credit channel. 
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Subsection 5.2: Asset Expansion and Maturity Extension 
The decline and flattening of the yield curve is the intended outcome of BOJ’s 
unconventional monetary policy including policy duration commitment.  Needless to 
say, this was not achieved only by policy duration commitment but also by asset 
purchases which included JGBs of which the remaining maturities were long. 
BOJ’s asset purchases under CE and QQE coupled with the integration of JGB 
purchase modalities brought about extraordinary changes to the size and the 
composition of BOJ assets.  The asset size expanded to unprecedented levels (Figures 
12 and 13). 
 
Figure 12: BOJ’s Rapid Asset Expansion 
 
(Source) Author’s calculations based on data published by the Bank of Japan 
 
Figure 13: Rapid Increase in the Assets of Central Banks 
 
(Source) Bank for International Settlements (2014), pp. 86-87 
 
Moreover the average remaining maturity of the JGBs held by the Bank was 
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remarkably extended (Table 3).  Figure 14 depicts the maturity distribution of BOJ’s 
JGB holdings as of February 20th, 2015.  The data reveal that the average maturity of 
the Bank’s JGB holdings has already reached approximately 6 years and 3 months.  
 
Table 3: Average Maturity of JGBs Purchased by BOJ 
 
(Source) Bank of Japan, Financial Markets Department (2014), p. 25 
 
Figure 14: Maturity Distribution of BOJ’s JGB Holdings 
 
(Source) Author’s calculations based on data published by the Bank of Japan 
 
Subsection 5.3: Projections for Bank of Japan Income during Policy Normalization 
 5.3.1: Brief Overview of Recent Developments 
The expansion of BOJ assets, the maturity extension of its JGB holdings and the 
overall decline in the yield curve significantly affect the Bank’s profit and loss 
statements.  In recent years, up to the first half of Fiscal 2014, the Bank net income has 
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benefited immensely from the asset expansion factor (Figure 15). 
 
Figure 15: BOJ’s Profit Expansion 
 
(Source) Author’s calculations based on data published by the Bank of Japan 
 
However such favorable developments will not necessarily continue.  The decline 
and flattening of the yield curve have led to the reduction in the average yield the Bank 
earns from its assets as also shown in Figure 15.  Moreover, maturity extension of the 
Bank’s JGB holdings could pose a threat to future income in the event that short-term 
interest rates start to rise. 
 
 5.3.2: Assumptions for Future Income Projections 
In this light, this section will provide projections for BOJ’s future income18.  The 
estimation will be based on four basic assumptions. 
The first assumption is the simplified model balance sheet which the author 
constructed to simulate the Bank’s earnings.  As the starting point for the future 
developments in BOJ’s balance sheet, the author estimated the average balance sheet of 
BOJ’s Fiscal 2014 (Figure 16).  The official statements for the Bank’s Fiscal 2014 will 
not be reported before mid-2015 and so the estimation for average balance sheet for 
Fiscal 2014 was broadly based on the Bank’s balance sheet data as of the end of 
October 2014, one month after the mid-point of Fiscal 201419.  The net income for 
18 The author was inspired and motivated by the earlier works of Iwata and Japan Center for 
Economic Research (Eds.) (2014, in Japanese).  Presumably because the average maturity of BOJ’s 
JGB holdings has been further extended since their publication, the income projections estimated in 
this paper show a bleaker picture of the future than their estimations. 
19 In order to estimate the average for Fiscal 2014, the balance sheet at the end of October 2014 
rather than the midpoint, the end of September 2014, was chosen to take into consideration the fact 
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Fiscal 2014 based on this estimated average balance sheet of BOJ was calculated as 
¥ 1050 billion, which coincides with approximately twice the size of net income the 
Bank earned in the first half of Fiscal 2014. 
 
Figure 16: Simplified Model Balance Sheets of the Bank for Fiscal 2014 and 2016 
 
(Source) Author’s estimations based on data published by the Bank of Japan 
 
The second assumption is that BOJ will succeed in reaching the price stability 
target of 2 % CPI inflation at around the end of Fiscal 2015, which is the end of March 
2016.  This is in line with the Bank’s own forecast stated in the semiannual Outlook 
Report20.  This assumption implies that gradual changes in the policy framework might 
occur only after the end of Fiscal 2015. 
The third assumption is that monetary policy normalization after Fiscal 2016 will 
follow the similar process which the Federal Reserve System in the United States is 
planning to take21.  Policy normalization is assumed to be carried out in the following 
that Bank in late October 2014 announced an acceleration in the pace of JGB purchases from ¥ 50 
trillion per year to ¥80 trillion per year. 
20 In the “Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices (October 2014)” published on October 31st, 
2014, BOJ projected that CPI inflation is likely to “subsequently accelerate gradually and reach 
around 2 percent -- the price stability target -- around the middle of the projection period; that is, in 
or around fiscal 2015.”  The Bank broadly maintained this projection in the interim assessment 
disclosed on January 21st, 2015. 
21 Please see “Policy Normalization Principles and Plans” which the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve System announced in September 17th, 2014.  The 
document can be located at the following URL. 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20140917c.htm 
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order. 
1. First comes the so-called tapering, which is the gradual reduction in the pace of 
asset purchases.   
2. Second is the termination of asset purchases.   
3. Third is the start of very gradual policy rate hikes. 
4. Fourth, BOJ will abstain from selling the assets it purchased and will hold onto 
each asset until its maturity. 
Please note that asset purchases including JGB purchases are assumed to continue 
even after BOJ succeeds in reaching the price stability target of 2 % CPI inflation at 
around the end of March 2016.  Thus the author assumes that the increase in BOJ’s 
JGB holdings and the matching increase in the monetary base including the 
remunerated reserves22 would be ¥ 80 trillion and ¥ 65 trillion for the average balance 
sheets of Fiscal 2015 and Fiscal 2016 respectively (Figure 16)23.  BOJ’s JGB holdings 
are assumed to peak in Fiscal 2016. 
The fourth assumption is regarding future interest rates.  The future path of 
interest rates is assumed to follow the implied forward rates calculated using JGB data 
published by the Ministry of Finance.  These rates will be applied to the interest rates 
BOJ pays to the commercial banks for excess reserves held in the Complementary 
Deposit Facility24.  In addition, it is assumed that financial institutions (FIs) which 
borrow loans from BOJ will be charged interests at a rate 0.2 % points higher than the 
rate applied to remunerated reserves. 
Based on implied forward rate data as of February 20th, 2015, the future rate hikes 
will be very slow and gradual.  The interest rates paid for remunerated reserves are not 
expected to exceed 0.5 % before 2020. 
Based on the four assumptions explained above, this paper will calculate the future 
income of BOJ25.  But there remains yet one important element which is critical in 
22 For excess reserves, BOJ currently provides a facility named “Complementary Deposit Facility” 
for which the Bank currently pays an interest rate of 0.1 %. 
23 This is contemplating JGB increases of ¥ 80 trillion per year during Fiscal 2015 until the end of 
March 2016 and further JGB increases of ¥ 50 trillion during Fiscal 2016.  For Fiscal 2016, the 
author is assuming “tapering” in the pace of yearly purchases of JGBs to the pre-October 2014 pace. 
24 Please see again “Policy Normalization Principles and Plans” which the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve System announced in September 17th, 2014.  The 
Federal Reserve stated that during policy normalization, “the Federal Reserve intends to move the 
federal funds rate into the target range set by the FOMC primarily by adjusting the interest rate it 
pays on excess reserve balances.”  This paper’s assumption regarding the interest rates BOJ pays 
for excess reserves is broadly following the Federal Reserve’s normalization principles. 
25 In addition to the four assumptions described in the main text, it is assumed that the Bank will 
continue to earn the same yield of 0.3 % from JGB holdings after Fiscal 2016 and will continue to 
annually pay the same amount of “General and Administrative Expenses and Costs” of ¥ 190 billion 
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making any estimates on future income. 
Projections of future BOJ income will depend on how quickly the Bank can 
downsize its extraordinarily expanded asset portfolio.  However, this paper made a 
practically reasonable assumption that the Bank will abstain from selling the assets and 
will hold onto each asset until its maturity.  Therefore, the downsizing pace will 
critically depend on the maturity distribution of the Bank’s JGB holdings in Fiscal 2016, 
the year when the asset size is assumed to reach its peak. 
Unfortunately, precise information on the maturity distribution of the Bank’s JGB 
holdings during Fiscal 2016 will not be made available until then.  In order to fill this 
gap, this paper will envision the following two different maturity extension scenarios 
which would determine the assumed maturity distribution of the Bank’s JGB holdings 
during Fiscal 2016 and the subsequent path of the Bank’s asset downsizing. 
The first scenario will be named the Extreme Extension Scenario.  On October 
31st, 2014, the Bank announced “[t]he average remaining maturity of the Bank's JGB 
purchases will be extended to about 7-10 years (an extension of about 3 years at 
maximum compared with the past).”  In line with this policy statement, it is assumed 
that, in Fiscal 2016, the Bank will extend the average maturity of JGB holdings to 
around 10 years and build a JGB portfolio almost evenly distributed across all 
maturities between 1 year and 20 years.  Figure 17 depicts the maturity distribution of 
the Bank’s JGB holdings under this Extreme Extension Scenario. 
 
Figure 17: Maturity Distribution under the Extreme Extension Scenario 
 
(Source) Author’s assumptions 
 
as it did in Fiscal 2013. 
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The second scenario will be named the Moderate Extension Scenario.  In this 
scenario, it is assumed that the maturity distribution of BOJ’s JGB holdings will 
maintain the same composition depicted in Figure 14.  Thus, the assumed average 
maturity of the Bank’s JGB holdings will remain the same at approximately 6 years and 
3 months under the Moderate Extension Scenario. 
Figure 18 depicts the projections of BOJ’s average balance sheet for Fiscal 2024, 
which is the 8th year after the Bank starts its asset downsizing.   The comparison of 
the 2 balance sheets shows a large difference in the total asset size as well as in the size 
of the remunerated reserves which determines the future cost estimate for the Bank. 
 
Figure 18: How BOJ Balance Sheet Would Appear in Fiscal 2024 
 
(Source) Author’s assumptions 
 
 5.3.3: Future Income Projection under Extreme Extension Scenario 
Under the Extreme Extension Scenario, BOJ will be able to downsize its asset size 
only gradually (Figure 19).  As a result, it is estimated that the Bank may suffer from 
the negative interest rate spread and may incur heavy losses between Fiscal 2020 and 
2028 (Figure 20).  Total losses during the 9 years are estimated to exceed ¥6 trillion 
and to deplete a substantial portion of the Bank’s capital.   
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Figure 19: Gradual Asset Reduction under Extreme Extension Scenario 
 
(Source) Author’s assumptions 
 
Figure 20: BOJ Net Income Projection under Extreme Extension Scenario 
 
(Source) Author’s projections based on data published by the Bank of Japan 
 
It should be understood that such large losses are caused by the maturity 
composition of the Bank’s balance sheet structure.  In general, commercial banks 
which hold long-term assets funded by short-term liabilities and perform maturity 
transformation functions in financial intermediation are exposed to such risk of loss 
when interest rates increase.  Central banks with similar maturity composition of assets 
and liabilities would face similar difficulties. 
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 5.3.4: Future Income Projection under Moderate Extension Scenario 
Under the Moderate Extension Scenario, BOJ will benefit from a good head start 
in downsizing its asset size in the first several years after Fiscal 2016 (Figure 21).  As 
a result, it is estimated that the years that the Bank may incur losses from the negative 
interest rate spread would be limited to five years between Fiscal 2020 and 2024 (Figure 
22).  Total losses during the 5 years are estimated to exceed ¥1 trillion. 
 
Figure 21: Rapid Asset Reduction under Moderate Extension Scenario 
 
(Source) Author’s assumptions 
 
Figure 22 BOJ Net Income Projection under Moderate Extension Scenario 
 
(Source) Author’s projections based on data published by the Bank of Japan 
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Even under this Moderate Extension Scenario, however, it is estimated that BOJ 
may incur losses.  This is because of the negative interest rate spread which is an 
inevitable consequence of the maturity extension in the central bank asset composition.  
BOJ would be holding onto long-term assets including JGBs and such assets need be 
funded by short-term liabilities which could face cost increases. 
Some may argue that the Bank can elect not to pay interest on excess reserves.  
Even if the Bank chose not to pay interest on excess reserves, it would nonetheless have 
to issue some form of debt instruments such as reverse repos so that the Bank can 
continue to hold and maintain the huge asset portfolio including long-term JGBs.  
Such debt instruments would have to pay a positive nominal interest in order to 
compensate for the positive inflation expectation which may well be anchored around 
the price stability target of 2 %. 
Others may argue that the Bank can elect to sell a part of its JGB holdings in order 
to accelerate the downsizing of its assets.  However it is very difficult to envision an 
environment where BOJ would be able to sell the JGBs without incurring any capital 
losses.  As previously mentioned, the estimate in this paper is based on the assumption 
that the Bank would succeed in maintaining the price stability target, 2 % CPI inflation, 
in a stable manner.  Higher inflation expectations during the post-success periods 
would likely be reflected in higher yields for JGBs traded in the market which would 
entail value loss of such securities.  
It may seem ironic that BOJ’s monetary policy success in achieving the price 
stability target would harm the prospects of avoiding future losses.  But policy makers 
and the general public should come to terms with the harsh realities which awaits the 
Japanese economy.  The flattened yield curve held down at extremely low levels and 
the maturity extension of the Bank’s JGB holdings, which are both intended byproducts 
of BOJ’s unconventional monetary policies including policy duration commitment in 
the recent years, would not allow the Bank to escape the inevitable consequences of the 
interest rate squeeze. 
 
Subsection 5.4: Summary and Lessons Learned 
BOJ’s unconventional monetary policy including policy duration commitment has 
succeeded in flattening and bringing down the yield curve at extraordinarily low levels.  
These developments are intended outcomes and significant achievements of the Bank’s 
policy actions in the past 15 years.  
However, when such unconventional monetary policy actions include the central 
bank’s large scale purchase of long-term assets coupled with the maturity extension of 
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the asset portfolio, unintended consequences may arise.  The prospect for central bank 
losses is one of such unintended but inevitable consequences. 
Central bank losses or insolvencies may not necessarily lead to “bail-out” of the 
central bank by the government using taxpayer money.  But, when the central bank is 
suffering from losses, the central bank would not be able to remit to the government the 
bank’s net income which the government would expect to receive under normal 
circumstances26. 
Therefore BOJ and the Japanese government would not be able to escape the 
quasi-fiscal policy consequences or, to say the least, the fiscal implications caused by its 
future income flows during the process of monetary policy normalization.  The losses 
the Bank is estimated to suffer in the first half of the 2020’s could be interpreted as 
indirect fiscal subsidy paying Japanese taxpayer money to the depositors at Japanese 
commercial banks.  BOJ would be paying interest to the commercial banks to 
compensate for inflation expectation stably anchored around 2 %. 
From another perspective, the Bank’s estimated losses in the first half of the 2020’s 
could be understood as the consequence of unintended inter-temporal transfer of wealth 
from the 2020’s to the mid-2010’s. As shown in Figure 15, the Bank is benefiting from 
large income caused by asset expansion in the mid-2010’s. 
Three lessons could be learned. 
First is the need for cost benefit analysis of maturity extension.  Unconventional 
monetary policy tools such as large-scale asset purchases coupled with policy duration 
commitment all contributed to bringing down the yield curve.  But the comparison of 
Figure 20 and Figure 22 suggests that maturity extension of JGB purchases or JGB 
holdings would entail larger losses for BOJ in the future.  Both the benefit and cost of 
JGB maturity extension should be carefully reexamined and compared when the Bank 
considers further extension of average maturities for JGB purchases. 
Second is the need to consider increasing BOJ’s own reserve fund.  As suggested 
previously, if the Bank and the Japanese government were to recognize that the 
extraordinary profits the Bank is recording in the mid-2010’s could be the consequence 
of inter-temporal transfer of wealth from the first half of the 2020’s when the Bank is 
projected to record losses, a more rapid increase in the Bank’s own reserve fund could 
be justified.  A larger legal reserve fund would work as the buffer for potential losses 
26 Article 53 of Bank of Japan Act entitles the national treasury of the Japanese government to 
receive the remaining surplus of the Bank’s income after deducting the reserves and dividend 
payment.  For example, based on the financial statements for Fiscal 2013, BOJ paid ¥ 579 billion to 
the Japanese government, which constitutes nearly 13 % of the Japanese government’s non-tax 
revenue of ¥ 4,631 billion which was expected in the initial budget for Fiscal 2014. 
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in the future.  In this regard, the author views as promising the recent developments 
where the Bank transferred to the legal reserve, with authorization from the Minister of 
Finance, larger portions of the annual surplus than what the Bank of Japan Act would 
require27. 
Third is recognition of fiscal democracy principles.  In general, monetary policy 
actions, whether they are conventional or unconventional, cannot avoid fiscal 
consequences or fiscal implications.  And monetary policy actions of many central 
banks are protected by operational independence.  But monetary policy independence 
does not justify economic policies of any kind to circumvent democratic rules on fiscal 
policy.  It is worthwhile considering what would be the most appropriate way central 
banks and the government could inform the taxpayers or the general public about the 
monetary policy impact on future net income of the central bank and its quasi-fiscal 
policy consequences. 
 
  
27 According to the Bank of Japan’s Appropriation of Net Income for the 129th Fiscal Year/ Fiscal 
2013, the Bank transferred to its Legal Reserve Fund ¥ 145 billion, which constitutes 20 % of the 
Bank’s Net Income for Fiscal 2013 which reached ¥ 724 billion.  Article 53 of Bank of Japan Act 
requires the Bank to transfer 5 % of the surplus Net Income. 
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Section 6: Central Bank Challenges in the Age of Forward Guidance 
Forward guidance or more specifically BOJ’s policy duration commitment 
constitutes an essential part of unconventional monetary policy instruments which the 
central banks invented, employed and developed in the 21st century.  The simple 
empirical analysis employed in this paper found that the market believes or perceives 
that the Bank’s policy duration commitment is a credible commitment, which has in 
turn helped the Bank to manage expectations of future interest rates and control the 
level and shape of the yield curve at an extraordinarily low range.  The suppressed 
yield curve has helped businesses and households to decrease their financing costs and 
has supported macroeconomic recovery and growth as well, which may indicate that the 
conventional policy transmission mechanisms of the interest rate channel and the credit 
channel are at work. 
However, forward guidance including policy duration commitment does have its 
share of difficulties.  The impact of forward guidance including policy duration 
commitment was never assured or stable.  And its magnitude has been time-variant.  
Evolution in the policy frameworks and improvement in communication skills appeared 
to have played crucial roles in enhancing the effect of policy duration commitment.  
More importantly, the extraordinarily low and flattened yield curve, if coupled with 
maturity extension of central bank assets, would pose threats to the future income of 
central banks, which could have serious fiscal implications.  
Therefore, three issues or challenges are worthy of further discussions or studies 
with regard to forward guidance or policy duration commitment of central banks. 
First is with regard to the operational aspect.  Sooner or later, economies will 
have to tackle with monetary policy normalization and unwinding of many of the 
unconventional policy measures.  But, in this process of policy normalization, central 
banks are likely to continue utilizing forward guidance or policy duration commitment.  
The intellectual assets central banks have accumulated through managing and 
controlling market expectations in the past decade are too valuable to dispense with. 
However, central banks have limited experience in employing forward guidance or 
policy duration commitment during macroeconomic cycles when monetary 
accommodation is removed or when interest rates rise.  It is much easier to commit to 
maintaining future policy rates at a certain low level than to communicate the central 
bank’s precise intentions on the timing, frequency, pace and extent of future interest rate 
hikes to the market.  Therefore, both central banks and participants in the global 
financial markets have to learn and further develop communication skills in the coming 
policy normalization era. 
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Second is with regard to the theoretical aspect.  Should we not focus more on the 
interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission mechanisms?  Recent 
developments in central bank policies have attracted much attention to the monetary 
quantity variables such as the monetary base or the size of central bank assets and their 
dynamic impact on expectations of future developments in macroeconomic variables. 
In contrast, central bank policy rates and other interest rates do not necessarily play 
a large role in theoretical models of academic monetary economics.  Therefore, 
academic refocus on the conventional interest rate channels of policy transmission 
mechanisms and further research utilizing yield curve information including both level 
and slope data might help policy makers and central bank practitioners to comprehend 
and analyze the costs and benefits of monetary policy actions including forward 
guidance and policy duration commitment.  The author is encouraged by Fujiwara et al 
(2014) calling for sound theoretical backgrounds in public policy and also by Friedman 
(2014) recommending monetary policy theories to recognize the existence of multiple 
policy instruments.   
Third is with regard to institutional aspects of economic policies.  In many 
economies, operational independence of monetary policy is protected by law or by 
social conventions.  Recent experience with unconventional monetary policy involving 
yield curve flattening and maturity extension has revealed that monetary policy could 
pose potential risks to future central bank income and could lead to quasi-fiscal policy 
consequences.   
Monetary policy independence does not justify economic policies circumventing 
democratic control on fiscal policies.  Recently, much attention is devoted to the 
opposite issue: the issue of the so-called fiscal dominance of monetary policy.  But 
more attention to the issue of the monetary policy intrusion into fiscal policy may also 
be warranted.  Therefore, both policy makers and academic scholars should consider 
how the taxpayers can be appropriately informed of the fiscal implications of monetary 
policy as well as how monetary policy independence and democratic governance of 
fiscal policy can be reconciled. 
The author hopes this paper has contributed to further expanding and deepening 
the scope of debates regarding central bank policies. 
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